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 Social Structure, Culture and Citizenship 
Tharaileth Koshy Oommen 
Social science in general and the three nomothetic disciplines of economics, political 
science and sociology in particular were eager to attain accreditation as »scientific« 
disciplines. Given this anxiety they emulated the Newtonian-Cartesian model which 
pursued universal laws irrespective of time and space. However, this has been ques-
tioned even by »western« scholars. Thus Immanuel Wallerstein argues that »if social 
science is to make any progress in the 21th century, it must overcome the Eurocen-
tric heritage which has distorted its analysis and its capacity to deal with problems 
of the contemporary world« (1997: 22). In the mean time several Asian scholars too 
started interrogating the universality of social science theories and concepts devel-
oped in the West (e.g. Oommen 1995; Alatas 2001). It is against this background 
that I would like to address the present theme. 
Citizenship in the Three Worlds 
There was widespread endorsement in the latter half of twentieth century that citi-
zenship as a legal instrument provided for equity and entitlement. But in practice it 
was rarely so because citizenship was and continues to be, linked to nationality. 
Nationality was always based on territoriality and language but religion and race 
were/are also invoked as bases of ascribing nationality. Therefore, social and cul-
tural factors often become the bases of inclusion and exclusion of citizens. Even the 
tripartite division of the world – First, Second, Third – is of doubtful value to un-
derstand the context and content of citizenship. Thomas H. Marshall’s (1965) civil 
rights consist of liberty of person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, and the 
right to justice. Political rights are mainly the right of franchise and the right of 
access to public office. Social rights, which are actually economic in content, consist 
of the right to a modicum of economic welfare and social security, to a full share of 
the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards 
prevailing in society. 
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The differences between the three worlds – First, Second and Third – were taken 
for granted by most social scientists that the structures and processes in these 
worlds were often contrasted. And, generally speaking, the difference between the 
First and Second worlds was striking with regard to citizenship rights in that civil 
and political rights were almost completely absent in the latter. Because the socialist 
state abolished individual ownership of property, seizing it all for itself, rendered 
civil rights largely irrelevant. Similarly, the moment for political rights disappeared 
because of the one party system and the installation of the nomenklatura, which to-
tally dominated the system. On the other hand, while substantial weight was given 
to the welfare component of social rights, the right of small nations to their social 
heritage was effectively blocked by Great Nation Chauvinism in the multi-national 
socialist states, leading to their disintegration. That is, for the individuals of rela-
tively homogeneous socialist states the possibility of maintaining the social heritage 
was substantial. This was also true of individuals who belonged to the dominant 
nations of multi-national states. The relevant point here is that the differences 
within the Second World were substantial with regard to certain social rights. 
In the case of Third World the situation is more complex and mixed. The only 
thing more or less common to all the countries in them is the absence of the citi-
zen’s right to even a modicum of economic welfare and social security. This is so 
not necessarily because of any ideological resistance from any section of the popu-
lation which was the case at least until recently, but because of the gross inadequacy 
of material resources at the command of Third World states. As for civil and politi-
cal rights, some of the Third World countries have exemplary records in this, while 
the performance of others is as tainted as that of the Second World. The point is 
that the countries of the Third World cannot be put into the same basket. The 
inescapable conclusion that one reaches is that the tripartite division of the world 
which was very popular during the Cold War period does not reflect the differences 
in and conceptions about citizen rights. In fact, differences within each of these 
»worlds« are as numerous as the differences across them. Hence, the appropriate 
unit to understand citizenship is an individual state and not a block of states. 
Even within First World democracies, the perceptions regarding the content of 
citizenship vary immensely. As Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon (1994: 90–107) 
note, Americans rarely speak of social citizenship because for them it does not 
imply rights and entitlements embedded in a contract but charity wrapped up in 
institutional welfare benefits. Social rights which connote respect and equality rarely 
figure in public debates. Welfare is stigmatized, but work is sacralized. Unemploy-
ment is viewed as a private predilection of citizens and not as a manifestation of 
social policy or economic pathology. In contrast, civil citizenship is highly valued. 
The hero of civil society, created by civil rights, is the property-owning individual; 
civil society is exemplified by »possessive individualism«, to recall the seductive 
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phrase of C. B. McPherson (1974). In fact, as civil society is possessed by individu-
alism, it is very difficult to liberate the body (civil society) of the spirit of individual-
ism as market was encapsulated in it. With the bifurcation of civil society and mar-
ket it is possible to recognize the altruistic and communitarian orientation of civil 
society as against the rapacity of the market (see: Oommen 1996: 191–202). 
Robbing social citizenship of its contractual character and viewing it as charity 
has had several consequences. First, the beneficiary becomes a mere recipient of 
charity with no entitlements, a situation that is morally degrading. Second, the giver 
of charity assumes instant superiority and accumulates moral merit, the concern 
being the giver’s entry into the other world and not the receiver’s physical survival 
in this world. Third, since the giver and receiver are usually strangers, the recipient 
cannot demand charity, but can only solicit it. And the cultural mythology of civil 
citizenship stands in a tense, often obstructing relationship to social citizenship. 
This is nowhere more true than in the USA where the dominant understanding of 
civil citizenship remains strongly infected by the notions of »contract« and »inde-
pendence« while social provision has been constructed to connote »charity« and 
»dependence« (Fraser/Gordon 1994: 104). 
The consequence of this juxtaposition of social and civil citizenship in terms of 
charity and contract is manifested in the widespread belief in the USA that the 
opportunity for economic betterment is widely available, that social mobility is 
determined by the individual’s efforts, and that, therefore economic inequality is fair 
(Klugel/Smith 1986: 37). Further, the feeling that the recipients of welfare exagger-
ate their needs, cheat the state and avoid work is widespread. That is, Americans are 
far more concerned about the duties or social obligations of the poor, particularly 
those who receive welfare support, than about their rights: »it is the moral fabric of 
individuals, not the social and economic structure of society that is taken to be the 
root of the problem« (Wilson 1994: 53). 
In a comparative study of nine West European countries regarding perceptions 
of poverty less than 25 percent of the respondents, except in the United Kingdom 
where the percentage was nearly half, attributed poverty to »laziness and lack of will 
power« (CEC 1979). That is, the attitude in the UK is fairly close to that in the USA 
about individual responsibility regarding poverty. And yet, there is a sharp differ-
ence between these two countries regarding the value orientations of citizenship. In 
the USA it is predominantly liberal and in the UK it is largely communitarian, al-
though the two value orientations co-exist in both these countries in differing pro-
portions (Conover et al. 1990: 1–33). 
The empirical analysis attempted by P. J. Conover and his colleagues confirms 
the differing emphases in regard to citizenship rights; American respondents focus 
on civil rights, whereas British respondents focus on social rights. With regard to 
citizens’ duties, the Americans focus on political responsibility, but the British re-
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sponses »contained« relatively more communitarian elements«. The central elements 
in identity of citizenship in the USA are freedom and individualism; in the UK these 
are a sense of belonging to the land, a shared heritage, and a national identity (1990: 
7–24). That is, the conceptions of citizenship vary drastically not only within the so-
called First World (the USA and Western Europe), but also between the UK and 
the USA. It is important to recall here that these two »nations«, the »first nation« 
and the »first new nation« of the world are widely believed to have common values 
and institutions; the USA is regarded as a replica of the UK. I suggest that the rea-
sons for their difference should be traced to the fact that they are drawn from dif-
ferent contexts, the Old and the New Worlds, and the consequent variations in their 
making and modes of incorporating citizens. In the UK citizenship and nationality 
were/are closely linked, in the case of USA it is ethnicity and citizenship that are 
linked. 
Citizenship and Nationality 
The second context to influence the content of citizenship is interstate migration. 
Baubock argues that immigrants should be regarded as members of the host society 
even if they intend to return to their country of origin, as membership is acquired 
gradually and is mainly a function of the duration of residence. This in turn is pos-
sible only if an open civil society exists which is not deeply fractured by class or 
ethnic cleavages: 
»If a society is strongly segregated along cultural boundaries immigrants will indeed have to make a 
choice as to whether they want to become members by assimilating, and institutions of the receiv-
ing society will control this admission by defining the criteria of successful assimilation« (1994: 173). 
There are several difficulties with this argument. First, if immigrants plan to leave, 
either for their homeland or for some other destination, that is, if they remain an 
ethnie, it is unrealistic to consider them as members of the host society. It may be 
the case that they want to leave precisely because they are treated as outsiders. In 
other words, whether the motivation to leave springs from their attachment to the 
homeland or from stigmatization in the host society, the fact remains that the im-
migrant has not become a member of that society. But this should not be viewed as 
an obstacle in accepting them as members of the host polity and in granting them 
citizenship rights and prescribing obligations. What I am suggesting is that to be a 
member of a society (that is, a national) is not simply a matter of voluntary choice, 
but also involves being accepted by other fellow nationals. In contrast, one can 
choose to be a member of a polity (that is, a citizen), and the authority of conferring 
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citizenship rights can be invested in the state. In other words, one can be an ethnie 
as well as a citizen; nationality need not be a prerequisite to becoming a citizen. But 
whether or not this is possible is dependent on the very concept of citizenship that 
a state adopts. 
Second, there is hardly any functioning civil society that is »open« to immigrants 
ignoring their background. Those societies that come nearest to being so are deeply 
divided by class, ethnic and racial cleavages, precisely because they are heterogene-
ous. A democratic polity today by definition cannot be a homogeneous society 
because the former is open and the latter is closed. That is, a nation-state that fos-
ters homogeneity is bound to produce a closed society. Several nations and ethnic 
groups can and should co-exist in a democratic polity, as this s the real test of 
openness. According to Ralf Dahrendorf: 
 »The true test of the strength of citizenship is heterogeneity. Common respect for basic entitle-
ments among people who are different in origin, culture and creed proves that combination of 
identity and variety lies at the heart of civil and civilized societies… Exclusion is the enemy of 
citizenship« (1994: 17). 
Third, the prescription of assimilation as a prerequisite for the immigrants to be-
come members of the host society is coercion, and is hence undemocratic. While 
assimilation often provides some material and symbolic pay-offs, the assimilated 
lose, or have reluctantly to renounce, their identity; they are compelled to destroy 
their »society« so as to become members of the host society. The immigrants may 
do it because of their precarious material condition; it is precisely because of this 
that, while they often resent assimilation under coercion, they cannot always resist 
it, because of their inadequate striking power. They are captives of their helpless-
ness. 
Both empirical reality (heterogeneity of contemporary state populations) and the 
prevailing value orientation (commitment to democracy) militate against the linkage 
between citizenship and primordial identities including nationality. This proposition, 
however, is not as startling as it appears. Jürgen Habermas asserts that »Citizenship 
was never conceptually tied to national identity« (1992: 4), but Liah Greenfeld and 
Daniel Chirot (1994: 79–130) identify three initial conceptualizations regarding the 
linkage between citizenship and nationality, while delineating the relationship bet-
ween nationalism and aggression which is an extension of Greenfeld’s earlier at-
tempt (1992: 11). It seems to me that these linkages were attempted to meet the 
specific requirements of state-building. The empirical reality has changed substan-
tially due to the emergence of the New World, dislocation of populations wrought 
by socialist states, the failure of the homogenization project initiated by nation-
states and the ongoing process of inter-state migration accelerated by modernization 
and globalization. 
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The English »nation« was initially conceptualized as a collective of sovereign in-
dividuals; this later gave birth to the individualist libertarian concept of the state. If 
individuals constitute the units of nation, citizenship and nationality could be bifur-
cated. Great Britain was thus conceived as collectivity of citizens drawn from differ-
ent nations – England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. This conception was functional 
to its state-building which explains the persisting ambivalence in characterizing both 
Great Britain and its constituent units as »nations« even among scholars. Other 
examples of this type are Switzerland, the Indian Union and the emerging European 
Union. In contrast to this is the conceptualization that views nation as a distinct 
people, the collectivistic-nation. In this mode of conceptualization citizenship and 
nationality got fused. The typical examples of this concept of nation are the Ger-
man and Italian nation-states. 
These two types of conceptualization have given birth to two different criteria 
of membership in the nation. Where nationality and citizenship are bifurcated, the 
former, at least in principle, is civic, that is open and voluntarisic; it can be acquired. 
In contrast, where the two are fused, membership in the nation is inherent, that is 
nationality has nothing to do with individual will and citizenship is inherited. One 
implies the other. The collectivistic nation and the multi-national/multi-cultural 
state are patently contradictory to each other and hence the meaning and content of 
citizenship in them vary.  
The third mode of conceptualization is a mutation of the above two and is ex-
emplified by the French case. In France an individual can acquire nationality, that is, 
citizenship, through a process of »Frenchification« learning the French language, 
receiving a French education and internalizing French culture, irrespective of race 
and religion. This in principle gives birth to a civic-collectivistic state fostering a 
community of citizens. However, there is a hierarchy of citizens and nationals even 
here; the white, Catholic, French-speaking citizens from France at the top, and the 
»Frenchified« black Muslim »immigrant« citizen at the bottom (see: Oommen 1997: 
164ff.). 
It is clear from the above analysis that delinking nationality and citizenship is an 
imperative if the society is to be rendered open and if the polity is to remain demo-
cratic. This should not endanger the integrity of the polity because it is possible to 
construct a political culture dissociated from national and ethnic origins, but an-
chored to the principles of multi-culturalism as noted by Habermas (1992: 7). The 
British model, in principle, fits the bill. But in practice a variety of collectivities feel 
deprived, both nationals and ethnies. Thus Ireland, Wales and Scotland are charac-
terized as internal colonies of the dominant English nation, although the nationals 
of these ›colonies‹ are citizens of the British state (Hechter 1975). The lower classes 
from these colonies may feel that they are »second-class« citizens. If so, the pre-
dicament of the non-national citizens, particularly the coloured immigrants, who are 
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also largely of the under class, can well be visualized. Granting citizenship entitle-
ments will at least partially erode the stigma associated with them as outsiders. 
Content of New Citizenship 
The importance of the suggestion becomes evident when one notes that consensus 
about the content of citizenship and the provision to protect the poor from the 
depredations of the market has been eroded of late. The four reasons listed by 
Herman Van Gunsteren for this erosion (1994: 36–48) may be paraphrased as fol-
lows. First, in the context of increased inter-state (the author refers to it as interna-
tional) spatial mobility, citizenship has become an eagerly sought-after status. The 
logical corollary of this is resistance to the conferring of citizenship on non-nation-
als – the issue of exclusion. Second, an increasing number of citizens has actually 
started to misuse, or is perceived to be misusing, their entitlement – the free-rider 
problem. Third, the state’s authority has been gradually diluted both by supra-state 
and intra-state agencies – erosion of state sovereignty. Fourth, the liberating and 
enabling provisions of the welfare state have come to be discredited – the current 
emphasis on the free play of market forces. 
To cope with the situation Van Gunsteren suggest a new type of citizenship, the 
neo-republican type, which draws its constitutive elements mainly from three mod-
els of citizenship – the communitarian, the republican and the individualistic (ibid.: 
45ff.). First the citizen is to be viewed as a member of a public community: the 
republic, which in principle gives freedom to individuals to form communities, to 
join or to reject them – the communitarian element. This freedom to join the re-
public is not available to the non-national groups and when they form their own 
»communities« which indeed is a mark of estrangement and alienation from the 
republic, they are accused of opting out of the »nation«. Second, there are elements 
of virtue to be drawn from the republican concept of citizenship: the competence 
to participate and the ethical commitment to play the role of citizenship are empha-
sized. But one can play the role of citizen only if and when one is assigned the 
status of citizenship. The problem faced by non-nationals in playing the role of 
citizenship is their very exclusion from the nation.  
The third model is citizenship as the primary office in the public community – 
the individualistic element. That is, to be meaningful, citizenship should be acti-
vated, it should be exercised. Once again, the role of citizenship being kept under 
suspended animation is not germane to be non-nationals, but its very acquisition is. 
The notion of a neo-republican citizen as an autonomous and loyal individual capa-
ble of making sound judgment and fulfilling the double role of governor and gov-
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erned, as van Gunsteren constructs it, is applicable only to nationals and not to the 
non-nationals. The problem of the latter is the very accessibility to citizenship. In 
the final analysis, if citizenship is to be rendered an enabling identity it should be 
delinked from all primordial identities – racial, religious, tribal and linguistic – which 
are invoked to form national identity. 
All societies are stratified on the basis of age, gender, and class. However, if a 
society’s population is drawn from the same race, religion and/or linguistic group, it 
could be designated as »homogenous«. Conversely, multiracial, multi-religious, and 
poly-ethnic societies may be referred to as heterogeneous societies. In this type of 
society, there is a possibility of inequality becoming a formal feature based on race 
(e.g. apartheid in South Africa or caste i.e. India, before 1947), which also renders 
them hierarchical societies. That is, heterogeneous societies with institutionalized 
inequality are hierarchical. A heterogeneous society need not however be hierarchi-
cal as racially and/or culturally diverse groups in the polity may have formal socio-
economic equality. Social structural features such as hierarchy and cultural hetero-
geneity make the realization of citizenship ideals more difficult. 
In the cases of stratified, heterogeneous, and hierarchical societies, the inter-
nality of none of the constituent elements is questioned. Thus, the American »Ne-
gro,« the Indian »untouchable,« and the Greek »slave« were all accepted as essential 
and useful internal elements although equality was not granted to them. In contrast, 
the internality of one or another segment in a »plural society« is questioned; that is, 
plural society is polarized between insiders and outsiders. Sometimes, the insiders 
may be marginalized (e.g. the First Nations in the New World) and the outsiders 
become dominant and sometimes the outsiders may be marginalized and deprived 
of their rights (e.g. Indians in Fiji, or guest workers in Western Europe). It is of 
signal importance to note that the first three types of societies are not either/or but 
additive types. That is, culturally diverse societies are also stratified. Hierarchical 
societies are stratified and heterogeneous, but plural societies are stratified and 
heterogeneous although they may or may not be hierarchical. However, they have 
one or more segments whose internality to the society is questioned. This cultural 
externalization undermines the citizenship status of the affected groups and com-
munities.  
Citizenship in India and West Europe 
Historically, the relationship between the state and citizens has been resolved in 
three distinct ways. These are the hegemonic type, the uniformity type, and the 
pluralist pattern (Worsley 1984). The Indian situation does not neatly fit into any of 
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these models, falling somewhere in between the uniformity type and the pluralist 
model. This is not simply because of the gap between vision and reality, a mere 
parxiological aberration, as is often argued, but also due to a serious theory gap 
traceable to compulsions of India’s historicity. During the freedom struggle most of 
the primordial identities (save the case of »Muslim nationalism« from the 1920s 
onwards) did not assume much saliency. However, once the historicity of context 
changed those temporarily frozen identities gradually started assuming salience. 
That is, the nationalist expectancy that all citizens of free India would enthusiastically 
involve themselves in the task of »nation building« irrespective of their socio-cul-
tural background was flawed and could not be easily realized. That is, the conceptu-
alization of the relationship between state and citizen did not adequately account for 
the specificity and complexity of the Indian situation. 
There is another context that creates ruptures between citizenship and national-
ity in multi-religious societies such as India. It is frequently argued that a prominent 
feature of a modern state is that it has a legal system which applies uniformly to all 
its citizens. Again, this argument is applicable and sustainable only in those cases in 
which society and polity are coterminous. Several legal systems coexist to regulate 
the behaviour of Indian citizens (Baxi 1982). First, the state legal system (SLS ap-
plies uniformly to all citizens in the all-India ›secular‹ contexts. Second, the religious 
legal system (RLS) applicable to those who profess religions of Indian origin and 
RLS applicable to co-religionists everywhere irrespective of their citizenship status. 
Third, the folk legal system (FLS), based on oral traditions, as practiced by the peo-
ple, in their specific regional-cultural contexts. 
The point to be noted is that the regional-religious diversity of India necessitates 
recognition and operation of legal pluralism with regard to civil laws. Some of the 
laws in RLS applicable to religions of Indian origin is incorporated into the SLS in 
the form of Hindu Code Bill and the state intervenes as reformer in the case of 
Hindus, this is not done in the case of »alien« religions (Smith 1964). The presence, 
operation, and recognition of different legal systems indicate the possibility of a 
multicultural system, functioning within a polity and state. That this arrangement is 
even desirable can be exemplified by noting the fact that people invoke different 
legal system (e.g. SLS, RLS, FLS) for different purposes, levels and contexts. 
Disputes that affect one’s prestige (izzat) in an individual’s kin-group, caste or 
community are usually processed though FLS and RLS. However, the possibility of 
resorting to SLS is greater if disputes do not adversely affect the prestige of the 
individual’s primordial groups, and if the adversary is an »outsider« to the individ-
ual’s group. Further, disputes that are processed through SLS on the one hand, and 
RLS or FLS on the other, usually differ in terms of their content. This dispute-cum-
adversary-specific response to different legal systems necessitates co-existence 
rather than conflict between them. However, this is not to suggest that the contents 
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of legal systems, particularly those of RLS and FLS, are always desirable, and that 
there is no need to evolve a generally applicable legal system for all the citizens of 
India, for example, a uniform civil code. The point I wish to make here is that even 
the criterion of a uniform civil legal system is not always applicable to multicultural 
societies, which creates rupture between citizenship and nationality. 
Language was the fulcrum on which states were built in Western Europe. Based 
on this experience, Ernst Gellner (1983), for example, argues that modern »nations« 
are moulded in their schools where shared national languages are taught and devel-
oped (Incidentally, Gellner like most other authors conflate state and nation). Ac-
cording to him, this is important for building states, because unless there exists a 
common communication medium, industrial societies cannot be sustained. In turn, 
this is based on the assumption and argument that modern nations emerged be-
cause of industrialization. The economy of the industrial society depends on spa-
tially mobile individuals who can sell their skills and labour in an ever-expanding 
market and who can communicate in a common language. Needless to say, Gell-
ner’s argument is based on the limited experience of the capitalist industrial societies 
of Western Europe and is not applicable to most other parts of the world and cer-
tainly not to India. Further, the argument is an ex-post factum rationalization. 
European states emerged out of nations; »one-nation, one-state« was the principle 
of state formation. At any rate, industrialization need not be linked to the formation 
of nation-states. Therefore, the argument cannot be sustained either on logical 
grounds or on empirical evidence. 
Indian nationalism is a product of colonialism not of industrialization. India re-
mains predominantly agrarian even today, and yet India has succeeded in building a 
modern national state. (The distinction between nation-state which is unicultural 
and national state which is multi-cultural needs to be kept in mind here). Neither 
industrialization nor a common language is prerequisites for building a modern 
state, as the Indian experience clearly demonstrates. Any attempt to impose a com-
mon language would put unbearable stress and strain on the societies and cultures 
of India, and the Indian polity will not be in a position to bear it. To put it differ-
ently, the conceptual distinction between citizenship and nationality is a prerequisite 
for the very survival of multinational states such as India. 
The same confusion persists in regard to conceptualizing the welfare state. Thus 
Michael Roche writes: »Welfare states depend on the existence of an effective common 
culture in modern societies. ›Culture‹ covers a variety of relevant factors including the 
existence of a common language and writing system (…)« (1992: 41). By this crite-
rion a multinational or pluri-cultural state cannot be a welfare state. India may not 
qualify to be a fully-fledged welfare state at present but it has all the potentialities to 
become one. The point to be noted here is that India, despite being a country in 
which numerous languages are spoken and have different writing systems, has not 
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necessarily found this to be a stumbling block in becoming a welfare state. A state is 
but a politico-legal entity, and if it can ensure for its citizens the opportunity for 
equal participation and entitlements, it can be a welfare state. To argue that in order 
to ensure equality of opportunity there ought to be a common language is to sug-
gest that cultural homogeneity is a precondition for the achievement of welfare. 
This should be viewed as antithetical to the spirit of democracy because a welfare 
state should celebrate cultural diversity, one of the ways through which authentic 
citizenship can be institutionalized. 
Conclusion 
The burden of my argument is that (a) even if the notion of citizenship is universal 
in its form, its substance vary across different polities; (b) this difference can be 
readily discerned in the varying emphasis put on the different dimensions of citizen-
ship – civil, political, social – in the First, Second and Third worlds; (c) even within 
the polities of the three worlds there are substantial differences; and (d) these varia-
tions can be better understood through the historical backgrounds, social structures 
and cultural compositions of particular national states. Thus to juxtapose indigeneity 
with universality is not rewarding in conceptual matters and theoretical orientations. 
While there is universality in certain contexts and layers there are particularities in 
some others. These specificities should be captured to fill the gap between data, 
concepts and theories.  
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